

## Message Text

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TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 272108

NODIS  
CHEROKEE - FOR BRZEZINSKI ONLY

FOL DAR ES SALAAM 4549 SENT ACTION SECSTATE LONDON GABORONE  
NOV 13, 1977 REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 4549

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS CHEROKEE

LONDON FOR MOOSE

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PDEV, RH, TZ  
SUBJECT; RHODESIA TALKS; TANZANIA'S POSITION

REF: STATE 272038

1. SUMMARY; AN OBVIOUSLY EBULLIENT PRESIDENT NYERERE TOLD ME  
NOVEMBER 13 THAT HE AND PRESIDENT MACHEL HAD REACHED COMPLETE  
AGREEMENT ON CONTINUING TO SUPPORT THE UK-US PROPOSALS ON  
RHODESIA. NYERERE AGAIN STRESSED THREE KEY PRINCIPLES: (A) SMITH  
MUST GO, (B) THE ARMY MUST BE BASED ON THE LIBERATION FORCES, AND  
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(C) THERE MUST BE FREE ELECTIONS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE. NYERERE IS  
GOING TO ACT ON THE BASIS THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT ALSO REMAINS  
COMMITTED TO THESE PRINCIPLES. NYERERE IS GOING TO SEE PRESIDENT  
KAUNDA NOVEMBER 18 TO PRESS THEM ON HIM. MEANWHILE, NYERERE WANTS  
US TO URGE THE BRITISH TO REMAIN FIRM AND TO COME TO GRIPS WITH  
THE PROBLEM OF DISPOSING OF SMITH. I REPEAT MY RECOMMENDATION  
THAT WE LEAVE NYERERE ALONE FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE TO TRY TO

DO HIS OWN VERY USEFUL THING. A POSSIBLE EXCEPTION TO THIS WOULD BE A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CARTER EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR NYERERE'S STAND. END SUMMARY.

2. I SPENT FORTY-FIVE MINUTES WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE AND FOREIGN MINISTER MKAPA SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 13. NYERERE HAD RECENTLY RETURNED FROM HIS MEETING WITH MACHEL IN MTWARA AND WAS ABOUT TO LEAVE FOR A FOUR-DAY TOUR OF ARUSHA IN NORTHERN TANZANIA. HE WAS IN AN EBULLIENT MOOD, OBVIOUSLY HIGHLY SATISFIED WITH HIS MEETING WITH SAMORA MACHEL.

3. NYERERE BEGAN BY REMARKING THAT HE HAD TOLD ME THE OTHER DAY THAT HE WAS UNDERTAKING FEELERS. HE HAD NOW MET WITH SAMORA AND FOUND THAT THE TWO OF THEM HELD EXACTLY THE SAME POSITION: SUPPORT FOR THE UK-US PROPOSALS AND CONTINUED FULL COMMITMENT TO NYERERE'S UNDERSTANDING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. NYERERE PLANNED TO SEE PRESIDENT KAUNDA FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 18, AND HE WOULD SEEK KAUNDA'S AGREEMENT TO THE SAME THING. MEANWHILE SAMORA WAS GOING TO TALK TO MUGABE, AND NYERERE WAS ASKING KAUNDA TO TALK TO NKOMO, GETTING THE LATTER TO LUSAKA WHILE NYERERE WAS THERE. IF NECESSARY, NYERERE WAS GOING TO CALL IN MUGABE HIMSELF.

4. NYERERE'S CURRENT LINE OF THINKING IS AS FOLLOWS: THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN THE RHODESIAN SITUATION ARE THAT: (A) SMITH MUST GO, (B) THE ARMY OF INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE MUST BE BASED ON THE LIBERATION FORCES BUT CAN INCLUDE ACCEPTABLE  
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ELEMENTS OF THE SMITH FORCES, AND (C) THE FUTURE LEADERSHIP OF ZIMBABWE MUST BE CHOSEN BY FREE ELECTIONS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE. NYERERE WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THE FIRST UPON US AND THE OTHER TWO UPON HIS AFRICAN ASSOCIATES.

5. NYERERE PROPOSED TO WORK FROM THIS BASE: MUGABE HAD TOLD LORD CAFVER HERE IN DAR THAT HE SUPPORTED FREE ELECTIONS. NKOMO HAD BEEN PRESENT AND HAD NOT CONTRADICTED. INDEED, IN A RECENT BBC INTERVIEW, JOSHUA HAD HIMSELF SUPPORTED FREE ELECTIONS. THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS HAD SUPPORTED FREE ELECTIONS AT LUSAKA. SAMORA HAD JUST CONFIRMED HIS SUPPORT. UNTIL SOMEONE TOLD NYERERE OTHERWISE, ELECTIONS WERE PART OF THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND EVERYONE ELSE.

6. NYERERE HIMSELF KNEW OF ONLY TWO DOUBTERS. KAUNDA WAS ONE. THE OTHER MIGHT BE OWEN. NYERERE BELIEVES THAT OWEN IS IN FACT FIRM, BUT HE HAS BEEN TOLD THAT OWEN, SPEAKING TO OAU AMBASSADORS, HAD ALSO SAID THAT "IF" THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT BY ALL, PERHAPS ELECTIONS WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. NYERERE DISAGREED STRONGLY. HE COULD NOT SEE ANY ALTERNATIVE TO ELECTIONS OTHER THAN CIVIL WAR. EVERYONE MUST STOP TALKING ABOUT "IF" AND CONCENTRATE ON WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO.

7. AS FOR KAUNDA, NYERERE INTENDS TO ASK HIM "WHERE THIS NO-ELECTIONS THING COMES FROM." HOW COULD ELECTIONS POSSIBLY LEAD TO CIVIL WAR? WHICH ZIMBABWEANS WOULD DARE TO OPPOSE THE FREE CHOICE OF THE PEOPLE? AND WHICH AFRICAN LEADER WOULD DARE TO SUPPORT THEM IN DOING SO? AFTER, RPT., AFTER THE ELECTIONS, THE WINNER MIGHT BE WELL-ADVISED TO ASK THE LOSERS TO JOIN IN SOME KIND OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. IF ANYONE REALLY WANTED TO GIVE SMITH A ROLE, THAT WAS THE WAY TO DO IT. NYERERE DID NOT THINK ANY ZIMBABWEAN LEADER WOULD WANT TO HAVE SUCH A PLANK IN HIS PLATFORM.

8. IN SUM, SAID, NYERERE, "TELL PRESIDENT CARTER THAT I AM STICKING WITH ELECTIONS." HE ADDED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD  
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SAID THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD NEVER ALLOW HIM TO SUPPORT A SOLUTION DESIGNED TO PUT SOME PARTICULAR GROUP OR LEADER IN POWER. "AFRICA WILL NOT ALLOW IT EITHER," SAID NYERERE. "I SHALL STAY WITH CARTER COMPLETELY AND HONESTLY."

9. NYERERE WENT ON TO SAY THAT SMITH IS NOW FEELING US PRESSURE. SMITH WANTED THE FRONT LINE TO SAY "NO" TO UK-US PROPOSALS AT LUSAKA. HE STILL IS TRYING TO MANOEUVRE SOMEONE ALSO INTO SAYING "NO." NYERERE DOESN'T WANT THAT TO HAPPEN. IF IT DOES, THE ONLY ANSWER IS WAR TO THE END AND THEN THE QUESTION OF ELEIWIIONS WILL BE IRRELEVANT.

10. NYERERE ADVISED THAT IF THE US WANTED TO DO SOMETHING USEFUL AT THIS TIME, IT COULD COME TO GRIPS MORE SPECIFICALLY WITH HOW TO GET RID OF SMITH. IF SMITH WERE GONE, THE OTHER ISSUES WOULD BE EASY. ALL PARTIES WOULD BE FACED WITH THE QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO NEXT AND THEY WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT ELECTIONS. THE BRITISH WERE WEAK ON THIS ISSUE. THEY COULD BRING NEW FACES IN THE GAME ON THEIR SIDE IF THEY WANTED TO, BUT THAT WOULD NOT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE WITH THE BASIC PROBLEM OF WHAT WERE THEY GOING TO DO WITH SMITH. (HERE, NYERERE WAS REFERRING, I THINK, TO LORD CARVER, WHOSE EMPHASIS WHILE IN DAR ON THE UTILITY OF SEEKING SMITH'S COOPERATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF AN ESTABLISHED STABLE MILITARY FORCE, APPARENTLY NETTLED NYERERE. NYERERE MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN RESPONDING TO AN EARLIER QUERY OF MINE ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF TRYING TO INVOLVE ADDITIONAL BRITISH PUBLIC FIGURES MORE DIRECTLY.)

11. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT I WAS SURE WE WERE FULLY AGREED ON THE MAJOR POINTS HE HAD MADE. THE QUESTION WAS HOW WERE WE GOING TO GET THIS CONSISTENT, UNIFIED AFRICAN POSITION OUT ON THE TABLE WHERE IT COULD HAVE ITS IMPACT ON THE SITUATION -- WHICH CERTAINLY COULD USE A SHOT IN THE ARMY  
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AT THIS POINT. HE REPLIED: "DON'T LET YOURSELVES BE SIDETRACKED. GET THE BRITISH TO MOVE FIRMLY. I HAVE TOLD YOU WHAT I AM TRYING TO DO." HE REMARKED PARENTHETICALLY THAT EVENTUALLY WE WERE PROBABLY GOING TO HAVE TO ENFORCE A SETTLEMENT THAT WAS LESS THAN FULLY AGREED BY ALL PARTIES, BUT THAT WOULD BE ALL RIGHT AS LONG AS IT DID NOT VIOLATE THE THREE PRINCIPLES--WHICH HE REPEATED AS IN PARA. 4 ABOVE.

12. COMMENT: NYERERE IS NOW CLEARLY AND DYNAMICALLY COMMITTED TO TRYING TO LINE UP HIS AFRICAN ASSOCIATES. WE CAN, I BELIEVE, COUNT ON HIS SHARING INFORMATION ON HIS SUCCESSES AND FAILURES WITH US. I THINK WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO: OVERDO OUR EFFORTS WITH OTHER AFRICANS TO SUPPORT HIM. NYERERE HAS A VERY REAL SHARED COMMON INTEREST WITH US, BUT HE WILL BE WARY OF APPEARING TO BE OUR CHOSEN INSTRUMENT. I REPEAT MY RECOMMENDATION THAT WE LEAVE HIM ALONE FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE AT LEAST -- WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF A LETTER FROM

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